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Abstract
  This paper develops a simple search model in which sector-specific trainings are endogenously 
determined with or without a negotiation between a worker and an employer and characterizes 
the allocation of two types of training. If a worker and an employee can negotiate over the 
amount of skill training, the training hours to acquire skill of this employer's sector is longer 
in the decentralized allocation than in the social efficient allocation. Meanwhile, if they cannot 
negotiate, the training hours is shorter in the decentralized allocation than in the social efficient 
allocation.
JEL classification: J24; J64
Keywords: sector-specific skills, job search, wage bargaining
1. Introduction
The efficiency property of human capital investment has provoked a great deal of controversy. 
In search theory, it is well known that a worker's training effort to acquire a single-dimensional 
skill (general skill) is lower than what it would be in the socially efficient level1. To the best of our 
knowledge, the efficiency property of the investment to acquire multi-dimensional skills2 has not been 
adequately discussed so far. Thus, in order to fill this gap, this paper constructs a search model with 
multi-dimensional skills and focuses on the efficiency of the allocation of (exogenous) training hours 
to acquire each skill.
In this model, there are two sectors, and each job in a sector requires a sector-specific skill for 
production. A newborn worker is initially assigned to a sector (which is called an initial sector) 
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and conducts skill training to acquire necessary skills by spending exogenous training hours. More 
precisely, workers decide to allocate exogenous training hours in order to acquire these skills at birth. 
In the market equilibrium, workers acquire the skills of not only the initial sector but also another 
one, because if a worker allocates too many hours to acquire a skill specific to the initial sector, she/he 
produces only a small amount of output in her/his job when switching to another sector.
Previous papers have discussed the importance of considering the efficiency of skill investment in 
an environment where a worker and her/his employer can negotiate over the investment to acquire 
skills3. In response to these discussions, I analyze the following two cases: The first case is that a 
worker and her/his employer can negotiate the allocation of training hours, and the second case is that 
they cannot negotiate.
There are potentially two sources of inefficiency, and these sources have opposing effects on the 
allocation of training hours. The first source is the hold-up problem, which is due to a lack of complete 
contingent contracts of wages, which leads to over investment in training to acquire a skill of an initial 
sector. The second source is the outside option effect, by which workers determine the allocation to 
improve their outside option in wage bargaining, which leads to under investment in training to this 
skill. If an employed worker and her/his employer can negotiate the allocation of training hours, both 
sources arise, and the worker may allocate less hours to acquire the skill of an initial sector than what 
would be socially efficient. Meanwhile, if they can negotiate, only the hold-up problem arises, and 
then, the allocation of training hours for this skill must be more than what would be socially efficient.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework. Section 3 
characterizes the socially efficient allocation. Section 4 defines the allocation characterized in market 
equilibrium, and section 5 concludes.
2. Environment
I consider a partial equilibrium and discrete-time model, and the measure of each period is one. 
Workers exit from the labor market with probability  (death shock), and the same number of newborn 
workers enter the labor market in each period. The number of workers in the steady state is then a 
constant and normalized unity. There are two sectors,  and , and two types of sector-specific 
skills,  and , where  indicates the amount of a sector  specific skill. To simplify, an 
employed worker exogenously moves to unemployment with probability  (job destruction shock), 
and an unemployed worker meets a vacant job in sector  with exogenous probability  (and 
). Note that I assume that workers and firms do not discount the future utility and profits 
due to the death rate.
An employed worker with a skill vector  produces  in a sector 
, where  and . To guarantee an inner solution,  satisfies the following 
properties; , , , and  is small enough. Moreover, I consider the 
equilibrium in which all workers acquire both  and    and then accept a job in both sectors.
3 See, for example, the survey by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999).
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Without loss of generality, I assume that newborn workers do not have any skills and are 
exogenously allocated to a job in sector  (called an initial job). They conduct skill training to acquire 
skills before starting to produce in the initial job. Note that workers cannot conduct additional skill 
training after their training period, in order to focus on the allocation problem of training hours. The 
number of training hours to acquire  is , where   is the parameter indicating the effectiveness 
of skill training, and the training hours constraints that are then faced by newborn workers are 
. Moreover, they must decide the allocation of training hours for  and .
Timing in each period is as follows: (i) Newborn workers decide the allocation of training hours 
for  and , (ii) employed workers produce outputs and conduct wage bargaining, (iii) the labor 
market is open, and (iv) job destruction and death shocks occur.
2.1. Flow conditions
Let  and  denote the number of employed workers in sector  and the number of unemployed 
workers at period  respectively. Given   and ,  has the following law of motion:
  (1)
The first term of RHS represents the number of newborn workers, and the second term is the number 
of unemployed workers who meet a job in sector , and the last term is the number of workers who 
do not lose their own jobs and die.
Similarly, the law of motion of  is:
  (2)
Finally, the law of motion of  is:
  (3)
The first term of RHS is workers who are separated by job destruction shock and go into 
unemployment pool, and the second term is workers who cannot find a new employer.
From (3)  and steady state condition , the number of unemployment in steady state is:
  , (4)
from (1) and (4) the number of employed workers in sector  in steady state is:
  , (5)
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and from (2) and (4) the number of employed worker in sector  in steady state is:
  . (6)
From (5) and (6), we obtain:
  . (7)
Equation (7) implies that  if , because newborn workers are initially allocated to 
jobs in sector .
3. The social planner's problem
First, I characterize a problem faced by a social planner. The social planner determines the optimal 
allocation of training hours to maximize social surplus, subject to the training hours constraint. The 
social planner's problem is defined by:
 .
The Lagrangian function associated with the above constrained optimization problem can be written 
as:
  ,
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier. The first order conditions are given by . From 
(7), the first order condition can be rewritten as:
  (8)
where . Given that , if , then , because in the steady 
state, workers are more likely to work in sector  than in sector .
4. Market equilibrium
This section solves the problem of market equilibrium. To do so, I first define the following value 
functions. According to Pissarides (2000), the value of unemployment is:
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  , (9)
The value of employment in sector  is:
  (10)
where  is wages, and the value of employer having a job filled is:
  . (11)
Note that I assume the value of employer after hitting job destruction shock is zero.
The wage is determined through the basic Nash bargaining. To simplify, assuming that the outside 
option of employer is zero, and then the first order condition of Nash bargaining yields:
 ,  (12)
where  is the parameter indicating the worker's bargaining power.
From (9) to (12),  can then be rewritten as:
 .
The marginal unemployed values of  are:
  , (13)
  . (14)
Next, I characterize the equilibrium allocation of the two types of training in the following two 
cases: (i) a non-negotiation case in which a worker decides the allocation of training hours to 
maximize her/his expected lifetime utility, and (ii) a negotiation case in which the Coase theorem 
holds for the allocation of training hours.
Note that the value of a vacancy does not affect market equilibrium in this model since job finding 
rate of unemployed worker and the outside option of employer is exogenous variable. Thus, I do not 
define the value function of a vacancy.
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4.1 Skill training: The non-negotiation case
In this case, a newborn worker determines her/his allocation of training hours to maximize . 
Formally, the optimal problem can be written as:
 .
Using the first order condition of Nash bargaining (12) , I rewrite the worker's problem as follows:
 
The above problem implies that a worker considers the effect on the outside option in Nash bargaining 
if , which is referred to as the outside option effect. Meanwhile, the social planner does not 
consider this effect because the level of the outside option only affects the share of output between 
a worker and an employer, but not the total output. Furthermore, when  (this 
really happens in equilibrium), this effect leads to more training hours to acquire  than there would 
be in the socially efficient allocation.
Formally, from (10) and (11) the Lagrangian function associated with the above constrained 
worker's problem can be written as:
 
　  　  ,
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier.
The first order condition is:
 . (15)
Given that , (15) implies that the benefit gained from an increase in  comes 
through the improvement of . From (14), an increase in  increases this benefit, because the 
worker's share of output determined by Nash bargaining increases. In other words, the hold-up 
problem arises, and a worker undervalues an increase in , thereby leading to underinvestment to 
acquire  when .
From (15), (13), and (14), the equilibrium allocation in this case is:
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 . (16)
Comparing (16) with (8), the equilibrium allocation is the same as the socially efficient allocation if 
and only if . Moreover, because the RHS of (16) is a decreasing function of , I can state the 
following proposition.
Proposition 1 If , the market allocation of training hours is inefficient, and workers allocate 
excess training hours to acquire .
Intuitively, there are two sources of inefficiency in the allocation problem, the outside option effect 
and the hold-up problem. These two sources have opposing effects on the training allocation. If , 
workers allocate excess training hours to acquire  in the market equilibrium because the outside 
option effect always dominates the hold-up problem.
4.2 Skill training: The negotiation case
Following the Coase theorem, the allocation of training hours is determined to maximize to the 
sum of  and  . The allocation of training hours is then determined by the solution to the 
following problem:
 .
From (10), (11), the Lagrangian function associated with the above constrained optimal problem can 
be written as:
  ,
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier.
The first order condition is:
 .
From (13) and (14), the optimal condition is:
 . (17)
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A comparison of (16) and (17) shows that a worker allocates more training hours to acquire , 
because the outside option effect is eliminated. The RHS of (17) is an increase function of , and 
similar to the allocation in the non-negotiation case, the equilibrium allocation is the same as the 
socially efficient allocation if . Thus, I can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If ,  is less in the equilibrium allocation than in the socially optimal allocation.
Intuitively, while the outside option effect is eliminated because of the Coase theorem, the hold-
up problem remains. Then, workers underestimate the benefit from improving outputs in sector . 
Moreover, workers allocate all training hours to acquire  if , and the skill training is socially 
optimal if  since the hold-up problem is also eliminated.
5. Conclusion
This paper investigates the allocation problem of training hours. There are two sources of 
inefficiency in this allocation: the first is that workers consider an effect on the outside option in the 
wage bargaining, and the second is the hold-up problem. When newborn workers are initially assigned 
to sector , the first source induces them to acquire the sector  specific skill, and the second source 
discourages them from acquiring this skill. If a newborn worker and her/his employer can negotiate, 
only the hold-up problem arises, and training hours to acquire the sector  specific skill are longer 
than the socially optimal hours. Meanwhile, if they cannot negotiate, the hold-up problem and the 
outside option effect occur, and the acquisition level of the sector  specific skill is lower in the 
decentralized solution than in the socially optimal level.
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